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The Role of Forecasts in
Monetary Policy
By Jeffery D. Amato and Thomas Laubach
F
orecasts of future economic developments
play an important role for the monetary
policy decisions of central banks. In the
United States, for example, at every meeting of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
the staff of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve present forecasts for inflation, out-
put growth, and a range of other variables that
give policymakers essential information for
monetary policy decisions.
This article argues that forecasts of goal vari-
ables can help central banks achieve their goals
and make them more accountable to the public.
The article provides two explanations for the
benefits of forecasts. The first explanation is that
monetary policy affects goal variables such as
inflation and output only with substantial lags.
Policy actions should, therefore, be based on
forecasts of goal variables at horizons consistent
with policy lags and be taken when these fore-
casts are inconsistent with policy goals. Under
suchanapproach,thequalityofacentralbanks
forecasts and the effectiveness of its actions to
bring forecasts into alignment with targets pro-
vide a basis for judging the performance of
policymakersandforholdingthemaccountable.
The second, and less intuitive, explanation
is that by focusing on a forecast of only one
variableinflationa central bank can poten-
tiallyachievemultiplegoals.Thisapproachcan
be successful even if there are tradeoffs among
the various goal variables. For example, the
approach can combine a commitment to long-
run price stability with concern for the effects
of monetary policy on output.
Thisapproachtomonetarypolicyisconsistent
with the recent practice in a number of countries
of assigning the central bank a single goal of
maintaining price stability. The approach also
potentially makes it easier to assess the perfor-
mance of the central bank and thereby hold it
accountable. In particular, judging the perfor-
mance of a central bank that has been assigned
the stabilization of a single variable as its sole
objective is easier than judging the performance
of a central bank with multiple and, possibly,
conflicting stabilization goals.
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lagged effects of monetary policy make the use
of forecasts necessary. The second section
argues that delegating a single goalsuch as
inflationstabilizationtothecentralbankfacili-
tates accountability, but at the risk of not achiev-
ing other goals. The section then examines how
theEurosystemandtheBankofEngland,bothof
which have been assigned a single goal, address
theexistenceoftradeoffsamonggoals.Thethird
sectionprovidesevidencethatamonetarypolicy
aimed primarily at stabilizing inflation fore-
castsas practiced by the Bank of England, for
examplecan, in fact, achieve multiple goals.
I. LAGGED EFFECTS OF POLICY AS
A RATIONALE FOR FORECASTS
Because monetary policy affects goal variables
such as inflation and output with considerable
lags,centralbankscannotstabilizethesevariables
at very short horizons in the presence of unantici-
pated shocks. They can, however, take actions
today to influence goal variables at the forecast
horizon consistent with policy lags. And, these
actions can bring forecasts of goal variables into
alignment with targets. Thus, while central banks
cannotbeheldaccountableforstabilizingallfluc-
tuations in goal variables, they can be held
accountable for stabilizing forecasts of goal vari-
ables at an appropriate horizon.
The goals of monetary policy
The primary goals of monetary policy are low
and stable inflation and sustainable economic
growth. The average level of inflation should be
low because inflation is harmful to the economy,
even if it is constant and perfectly anticipated.
Inflation variability should also be low because
unanticipated inflation is particularly damaging.
Forexample,wheninflationishighlyvariable
and therefore unpredictablefirms are prone to
make errors in their pricing decisions, which are
based in part on expected future conditions.
Monetary policy also seeks to achieve sus-
tainable economic growth. At each point in
time there is a potential, or efficient, level of
output, which is determined by the available
factors of production in the economy and the
available technologies. This efficient level of
output changes over time due to factors such as
thedevelopmentofnewtechnologies,theaccu-
mulation of productive capacity, or changes in
the labor force.
The actual level of output can differ from its
efficientlevel,butonlytemporarily.Anyattempt
by monetary policy to keep output permanently
away from its efficient level would destabilize
inflation and ultimately prove ineffective. For
example, consider a policy that tries to keep
output growth at some constant rate (starting at
the efficient level of output). If this rate of
growth is slower than that of the efficient level
of output, inflation would fall at an ever faster
rate; if this rate of growth exceeds that of the
efficient level of output, inflation would accel-
erateovertime.Tostabilizeinflation,therefore,
monetary policy should aim at keeping output
at its efficient level, or at keeping the difference
between the actual and efficient levels of out-
put, called the output gap, at zero.
Achieving goals in the presence of lagged
effects
Most central banks conduct monetary policy
by controlling the level of some short-term interest
rate.InindustrializedcountriessuchastheUnited
States, it takes several quarters for changes in
short-term interest rates to have their full effect
on inflation and output. In the presence of these
lags, a central bank can either base its interest
rate decision on an intermediate targeta vari-
ablethatisreadilyobservableandcloselyrelated
to its goal variablesor use forecasts.
In the past, many central banks, or their
respective governments, have chosen to use an
intermediate target for monetary policy. Such
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countrys currency vis-à-vis one or a number of
other currencies, or the growth rate of some
money stock. Intermediate target-based strate-
gies provided a straightforward answer to the
question of how to set the interest rate: the central
bank set the interest rate at the level necessary to
keep the exchange rate from changing or to keep
money growth at its target. Because the exchange
rate reacted to changes in the central banks
interest rate almost instantly, and the rate of
money growth reacted within a few months, nei-
ther of these two policies based on intermediate
targets depended on forecasts of goal variables.
Underlying these strategies was the assump-
tionthatstabilizingtheexchangerate,orcontrol-
ling the rate of money growth, would lead to the
desired results for the goal variables of inflation
and output growth. Over the past 25 years, how-
ever, a number of central banks that used either
monetary or exchange rate targets abandoned
these intermediate targets because the link
between the intermediate targets and the goal
variables became increasingly unreliable. The
lesson many central banks drew from this unsat-
isfactory experience was that monetary policy
should be aimed directly at goal variables, rather
than at some intermediate target.
Because goal variables respond to monetary
policy with considerable lags, directing mone-
tary policy at the goal variables themselves
requires forecasts. Absent a reliable relationship
between any intermediate target and the goal
variables, this forecast must take into account a
much broader set of variables, of which the
exchange rate or money growth are but single
elements. Furthermore, forecasts require not
only data on a range of variables, but also some
kind of model with which to translate the current
data into a forecast. Such models are inevitably
abstractions of the true structure of the economy,
numerous elements of which are not well under-
stood. Hence, the forecasts derived from these
models are fraught with uncertainty. While mak-
ing decisions on interest rates using a broad set
of information may be less prone to serious
misses than intermediate targeting, such a strat-
egy is still far from accident proof.
Besides serving as a guide to setting interest
rates, forecasts may also serve as a means for
holding the central bank accountable for its
actions. In a democratic society, the central
bank is accountable to the government, or the
public at large, for its conduct of monetary pol-
icy. Suppose the central bank is directed to sta-
bilize inflation at some low level and to
stabilize output around the efficient level. As
mentioned earlier, it may take several quarters
for the central banks interest rate decisions to
have their full effect on output and inflation. If
an unanticipated event suddenly altered either
of these variables, the central bank could do lit-
tle to immediately offset this impact.
In evaluating the central banks performance,
therefore, it is important to distinguish between
those developments in inflation and output the
centralbankcancounterfromthoseitcannot.It
would be misleading to focus exclusively on
the realized values of output or inflation.
Instead, by focusing on forecasts of these vari-
ablesatthehorizonatwhichpolicyactionsmay
affect them, the government and the public can
holdthecentralbankaccountableforonlythose
developments it can reasonably be expected to
have foreseen.
II. A SINGLE GOAL VS.
VARIABILITY TRADEOFFS:
A CONTRADICTION?
Recognizing the difficulty of holding a central
bank accountable for pursuing multiple goals, a
number of countries have recently given their
central banks a single goal: maintaining price
stability. This strategy for improving the cen-
tral banks accountability may be problematic,
though,duetotradeoffsbetweenstabilizinginfla-
tion and stabilizing other variables. This section
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Eurosystem and the Bank of England, both of
which operate with the single goal of maintain-
ing price stability, address this dilemma.
1
Tradeoffs among stabilization of goal
variables
Why, if the public cares about the effects of
monetary policy on variables other than infla-
tion, would a central bank be called on to pursue
onlypricestability?Oneansweristhatwithmul-
tiple goals it is difficult to assess whether the
central bank achieved the best balance among its
variousgoals.Ifthegoalsincludeoutputgapsta-
bilization, the situation is complicated further by
the unobservability of the efficient level of out-
put. By contrast, a mandate formulated only in
terms of inflation makes it easier to evaluate the
central banks performance because inflation is
readily measurable.
This approach to improving accountability
would be less problematic if all other goal vari-
ables that may be affected by monetary policy,
notably the output gap, were stabilized as well.
However, there may be situations in which there
is a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and
stabilizing the output gap. When this occurs, a
mandate for maintaining price stability might
lead to undesirably high output gap variability.
Handling variability tradeoffs:
The Eurosystem and the Bank of England
The Eurosystem and the Bank of England both
conduct monetary policy under mandates that
assign, in different ways, primacy to the goal of
maintaining price stability. However, both cen-
tral banks are mindful of the consequences that
their monetary policy actions have for economic
activity, and not merely for inflation. To take
account of output stabilization, the Eurosystem
emphasizes maintaining price stability over the
medium term, while the Bank of England
focuses on stabilizing inflation forecasts.
The Eurosystem. The Eurosystem consists of
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national central banks of the 11 countries that
have adopted the euro as their currency. The
Governing Council, which consists of the six
membersoftheECBsExecutiveBoardandthe
11 governors of the national central banks, is
responsible for the conduct of monetary policy
in the area of those 11 countries, the euro
area. Article 105 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community describes the primary
objective of the Eurosystem as maintaining
price stability and states that, without preju-
dice to the objective of price stability, its pol-
icy shall support the general economic policies
in the euro area.
In the pursuit of this objective, the Governing
Council is free to choose its operational strategy.
On October 13, 1998, the Governing Council
announced the main elements of its stability-
oriented monetary policy strategy. This strat-
egy consists of a numerical definition of the
objective of price stability and two pillars used
to achieve this objective: a reference value for
the growth of a specific monetary aggregate
and a broadly based assessment for the out-
look for price developments (ECB 1998).
In explaining its definition of price stability,
the Governing Council makes clear that price
stability is to be maintained over the medium
term, which is explained as reflecting the
need for monetary policy to have a forward-
looking,medium-termorientation(ECB1999).
In part, the focus on the medium term arises
because of the lagged effects of policy. The
Eurosystem cannot be held responsible for...
short-term shocks to the price level, over which
ithaslittlecontrol.Rather,assessingtheperfor-
mance of the Euroystems single monetary pol-
icy over the medium term ensures genuine and
meaningful accountability (ECB 1999).
Asecond reason for focusing on maintaining
price stability over the medium term is to per-
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turbances affecting the economy. The advantage
of such a response is that it avoids introducing
unnecessaryandpossiblyself-sustaininguncer-
tainty into short-term interest rates or the real
economy,whilestillmaintainingpricestability.
Inessence,byevaluatingoverasufficientlylong
horizon whether price stability is achieved, the
Eurosystemtoleratesshort-liveddeviationsfrom
the numerical definition of price stability, if nec-
essary, to avoid excessive output fluctuations.
The Bank of England. Since October 1992,
monetary policy in the United Kingdom has been
conducted using an inflation target. Under the
current arrangement, the Bank of England,
specifically its nine-member Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), has operational responsibility
for setting short-term interest rates to achieve
an inflation target determined by the UK gov-
ernment.
As with the Eurosystem, the need for forecasts
is in part determined by the lags with which
monetary policy affects inflation. The most
appropriate guide to monetary policy is the best
obtainable forecast of the probability distribu-
tion for inflation, over a time horizon defined by
howlongittakesforachangeinmonetarypolicy
to affect inflation (Bowen). The Bank of Eng-
land further stresses the importance of its infla-
tion forecast for its accountability to the
government and the public. Since February
1993, the bank has published a quarterly Infla-
tion Report, in which it provides both detailed
analysis of recent developments related to infla-
tion and its own assessment for future inflation.
Akey element of each Inflation Report is a chart
showing the banks inflation forecast over the
following eight quarters. The Bank of England
Act of 1998 does not require the MPC to pub-
lish a forecast of inflation, but we believe that it
is right to continue the practice....T h epublic is
free to comment on and criticize the projections.
It can assess the views that informed the MPCs
decisions (Budd).
Inflation forecasts also play a central role in
handling variability tradeoffs. The Bank of
England stresses the consequences of setting
interest rates such that its own forecast of infla-
tion eight quarters ahead is at its target value.
Although monetary policy affects inflation at a
horizon shorter than two years, an important
argument against controlling inflation at too
short a horizon is that the lagged effects of
monetarypolicycanlead...tolar ge-scale,ex-
cessive variations in output....[T]he MPC
should choose an appropriate horizon at which
to aim to return to the inflation target set by the
Chancellor. By doing so, they should be able to





How can goals for output and inflation both
beachievedwithamandateforcontrollingonly
inflation? This section shows how monetary
policycantakeaccountofothergoalsbypursu-
inginflationstabilizationatanappropriatetime
horizon. By setting interest rates such that the
banks forecast for inflation at some future time
iskeptatthedesiredlevel,ratherthanbyfocus-
ing on current inflation, the central bank can
balance its mandate of maintaining price stabil-
ity with the publics interest of avoiding unde-
sirable fluctuations in output.
2
Thechoiceoftimehorizonsforinflationfore-
casts is important because it influences the
behavior of other goal variables. Acentral bank
may move interest rates strongly to control
inflation at a short horizon, or move rates more
gradually to control inflation at a longer hori-
zon. The effects of an interest rate change over
the first one or two months are probably small,
suggesting big interest rate changes are needed
to stabilize inflation at short forecast horizons.
For example, in a relatively open economy, a
strong change in interest rates may have an
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 2000 5immediateinfluenceontheexchangerate,which
mayaffectinflationwithinafewmonthsthrough
a change in the prices of imported goods. By
contrast, moving the interest rate gradually to
control inflation over a longer horizon accepts a
greater amount of inflation variability in the
shortrunbutshouldleadtolessundesirablefluc-
tuations in economic activity.
This section uses a small simulation model to
evaluate the effects of policy over various time
horizons. The results show that a policy of stabi-
lizing inflation is best pursued by focusing on
forecasts of inflation at a five-quarter horizon.
A framework for analyzing the effects of
alternative policies
The framework, or model, used for evaluating
alternative interest rate policies consists of four
relations,eachrepresentingthebehaviorofagents
in the economy. The four relations explain the
movement in output, price inflation, wage infla-
tion, and the short-term interest rate over time.
3
The first relation is based on the assumption that
demand for output today depends negatively on
future expected real interest rates. In other
words, household decisions about how much to
consumetodayandhowmuchtosavedependon
expectationsoffuturerealinterestrates(expected
nominal interest rates less expected inflation).
In particular, an upward revision in household
expectations of future real interest rates causes
households to postpone a certain amount of
plannedspendingonconsumptionorinvestment.
Thenexttworelationsarebasedontheassump-
tionthat not all firms and households adjust their
prices and wages each quarter. However, firms
and households supply whatever quantity of their
product or labor, respectively, that is demanded at
the current price or wage. Prices and wages are
assumed to remain unchanged on average for
three quarters.
4
Whenever a firm adjusts the price for its prod-
uct, it sets the price proportional to the cost of
production that is anticipated over the lifetime
of the price, based on expected future demand.
The firms expectations of future demand are in
turnaffectedbyitsexpectationsofcompetitors
pricesoverthelifetimeoftheprice,becausethe
demand for its product depends on its price rel-
ative to those of its competitors. Similarly,
households enter into wage agreements, which,




cerned about their wages relative to those of
other households for the same reason that firms
care about their relative price. This behavior on
the part of both households and firms leads to
relationships between current inflation and
expected future costs, and between current
nominal wage increases and expected future
demand for labor services.
The fourth relation describes the way in
which the central bank adjusts its short-term
interest rate. Specifically, the central bank
changestheinterestrateinresponsetodevelop-
ments in output, wage inflation, and price infla-
tion. Even if the central bank is concerned only
with stabilizing price inflation, it may nonethe-
less react to developments in output and wage
inflation because those developments help the
central bank predict future price inflation. The
central banks interest rate today also depends
on its own past values insofar as the central
bank chooses to react to developments in the
economy in a gradual manner.
Thismodelwithparametersestimatedfrom
U.S. data characterizing household behavior,
technology, the process of price and wage adjust-
ment, and past monetary policyclosely repli-
cates the effects of monetary policy described
earlier. The responses of output and inflation to
an increase in the central banks interest rate,
while strongest during the first year following
the rate increase, are long and drawn out. Like-
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ingtherateincreaseandthenrevertsslowlyback
to its original level. That the model replicates
thesefeaturesofU.S.datasuggeststhat it captures
important determinants of output, price and
wage inflation, and the interest rate.
Policy goals and tradeoffs within the
framework
Not only does the model replicate key features
of U.S. data, it also implies specific goals for
monetarypolicythataresimilartothoseofmany
central banks. The goals are not all mutually
compatible, though, giving rise to tradeoffs
among the goals.
Policy goals. Because of the assumption that
individual households and firms maximize their
welfare and profits, the model can be used to
determine how monetary policy affects house-
hold welfare. Simulations of the model can then
beusedtoevaluatealternativepolicies,withpol-
icies that lead to the highest welfare considered
the best.
The factors that affect household welfare in
this framework correspond closely to the goals
of monetary policy discussed earlier. Specifically,
both the level and variability of price inflation
can be harmful, as is the variability of the output
gap. In addition, the level and the variability of
wage inflation can also be harmful. While stabi-
lizing wage inflation is not often mentioned as a
goal of policy, the model provides a clear ratio-
nale for this goal. As already discussed, the
demand that firms and households face for their
products and labor services depends, respec-
tively, on their price and wage relative to the
prices and wages charged by other firms and
households. Because firms and households can-
not adjust their individual prices and wages
everyperiod,highandvariableratesofpriceand
wage inflation reduce welfare by causing unin-
tended fluctuations in relative prices and wages.
This condition forces firms and households to
supplymore,orless,oftheirproductsandlabor
than intended.
The relative weights among the various goals
of monetary policy depend on the parameters
characterizing household preferences, technol-
ogy, and the price and wage adjustment process.
For the parameter estimates used here, house-
hold welfare is reduced almost as strongly by
wage inflation variability as by price inflation
variability, and as strongly by the average level
of wage inflation as by the average level of price
inflation.Therelativeweightonoutputgapvari-
ability, by contrast, is much smaller, reflecting
the fact that in the model households and firms
are more strongly affected by unintended fluctu-
ations of their wages and prices compared with
those of their competitors than by the economy-
wide level of income.
Tradeoffs among policy goals. If the efficient
level of output and the level of output at which
price inflation remains unchanged were identi-
cal, there would be no tradeoff among policy
goals. The central bank could stabilize both
price inflation and the output gap completely
simply by setting its interest rate so that at any
point in time the level of output demanded and
the efficient level of output were equal. Alter-
natively, the central bank should stabilize price
inflation completely, since by assumption the
level of output that would result under such a
policy would be the efficient level.
Such a simple prescription might not deliver
good results in practice, however, for several
reasons. The efficient level of output may be
highly variable. For example, technological
developments may sharply alter the efficient
level of output. Given that the central banks
short-term interest rate affects the demand for
goods and services only with substantial lags,
sharp swings in the interest rate would be
required to match, even approximately, aggre-
gate demand with the efficient level of output.
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the central banks interest rate cannot fall below
zero. To implement a policy that requires highly
variable short-term interest rates, the average
levelofshort-terminterestratesovertimewould
have to be high. And, high average short-term
interest rates would imply high average infla-
tion. This is because any nominal interest rate is
the sum of the real interest rate and expected
inflation, and the real interest rate in the long run
is determined by technological factors outside
the central banks control. Hence, a policy of
jointly stabilizing inflation and the output gap is
inconsistentwiththegoalofkeepingtheaverage
level of inflation low.
Another tradeoff comes from the fact that the
efficient level of output may not always coincide
with the level of output at which inflation
remains unchanged. This situation may arise
when some prices or wages adjust gradually in
response to changes in demand for products and
labor services, respectively.
For example, consider a technological innova-
tion that increases the productivity of labor. This
innovation causes firms to demand more labor
services, which leads households to demand a
higher real wage. However, not all households
can instantly adjust their wage. Those workers
have to supply whatever hours are demanded at
their current wage. Other workers, who have the
opportunity to renegotiate their wage, moderate
their wage demands because they compete in the
labor market with workers whose wages do not
adjust.
Under a monetary policy that holds the price
levelconstant,theresultingpartialadjustmentof
nominal wages implies a partial adjustment of
real wages. Workers, in general, supply more
labor than would be supplied if real wages were
free to adjust fully. As a result, output is pushed
above its efficient level. In contrast, under a
monetary policy that lowered the price level
after a technological innovation, real wages
would rise more and the deviation of output
from its efficient level would be less.
In summary, situations may arise in which a
deviation from price stability works in the
direction of stabilizing output at its efficient
level. Price stability still remains a goal of pol-
icy, but in such a situation a tradeoff exists
betweenpricestabilityontheonehandandout-
put gap stabilization on the other.
Monetary policy based on inflation
forecasts
In the presence of tradeoffs among goals,
monetary policy should seek to stabilize the
various goal variables based on the publics
assessment of their relative importance. In this
articlesmodel,forexample,householdwelfare
is more strongly reduced by instability in prices
and wages than by fluctuations in the output
gap. Therefore, the model suggests that it is in
the publics interest for monetary policy to
focus more on stabilizing wage and price infla-
tion than on stabilizing the output gap. The
question is: Can a central bank focus solely on
inflation forecasts and still achieve multiple
goals?Ifso,whichforecasthorizondeliversthe
best results?
To be precise, the simulations consider a cen-
tral bank that minimizes the deviation of its
forecastofinflationfromthedesiredlevelsome
kquartersahead.Forreasonsalreadydiscussed,
the central bank also minimizes interest rate
variability. However, the central bank deliber-
ately does not attempt to minimize fluctuations
in any other variables, such as the output gap or
wage inflation.
Foranysuchobjectivewithagivenhorizonk,
the central bank chooses an interest rate policy
that stabilizes inflation as much as it can, ignor-
ing fluctuations expected to occur up to k quar-
ters ahead. The simulations evaluate the policy
for each horizon from a public welfare perspec-
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not only about inflation performance but about
other goals as well. Trying to stabilize inflation
at too short a horizonfor example, trying to
keep inflation at its desired level from quarter to
quartermight create substantial and undesir-
able fluctuations in other goal variables. In con-
trast, focusing on a horizon that is too far ahead
might lead to large and prolonged deviations
from the desired level of inflation.
Evidence from simulations
Chart 1 shows the variance of goal variables
estimated for simulations of the model. The sim-
ulations are based on a monetary policy that sta-
bilizes expected inflation at forecast horizons
ranging from one to 16 quarters ahead. In the
chart, the variance of price inflation, wage infla-
tion, and the output gap are each multiplied by
theweightwithwhichitentersthepublicswel-
fareloss.Theweightonpriceinflationvariabil-
ity is normalized to 1.
As shown in the chart, the overall variability
of inflation increases initially as the forecast
horizon increases. Beyond three quarters, how-
ever, inflation variability falls almost to the
same level as when the central bank attempts to
stabilize all fluctuations in inflation. Only after
eightquartersdoesinflationvariabilityincrease
again. Output gap variability shows an almost
identical pattern. In particular, variations in the
output gap are minimized at forecast horizons
of one and eight quarters. Thus, looking only at
outputandinflation,aforecasthorizonofeither
one or eight quarters would appear optimal.
The pattern of wage inflation variability
across horizons looks markedly different. In
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Forecast horizonparticular,byignoringfluctuationsinpriceinfla-
tion expected over the first two quarters, mone-
tary policy can achieve a substantial reduction in
the variability of wage inflation, even though
wage inflation does not directly enter the central
banks objective at all. This is an example of the
tradeoffs among policy goals discussed earlier:
the increase in price inflation and output gap
variability is balanced by a reduction in the vari-
ability of wage inflation. The variability of wage
inflation is minimized at a horizon of five quar-
ters and increases thereafter.
Chart 2 shows the results from combining the
various components of the welfare loss using
theweightsinthepublicswelfarederivedfrom
the parameters of the model.
5 The welfare loss
is minimized at a horizon of five quarters. It
increases over the following three quarters and
then falls again until, at 11 quarters, it is only
slightlyhigherthanatfivequarters.Theincrease
over quarters six to eight is due to the rise in
wage inflation variability. From nine to 11 quar-
ters, wage variability falls while price inflation
and output gap variability remain relatively low.
Overall, the welfare loss shows little change
between one and 11 quarters. Beyond 11 quar-
ters, wage inflation variability rises steeply, and
beyond 13 quarters price inflation and output
gap variability rise. Welfare losses therefore
increase steadily beyond 11 quarters.
Other studies assessing the desirable forecast
horizon that use different models and different
methods arrive nevertheless at similar results.
For example, Batini and Haldane consider the
issue of the best forecast horizon for the United
Kingdom. Their work shows that the best results
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This article shows that the use of forecasts in
monetary policy can help central banks achieve
multiple goals and at the same time enhance the
central banks accountability to the public. The
article first presents the argument for using fore-
casts based on the fact that the variables that cen-
tralbanksseektoaffectreactonlywithsubstantial
delay to changes in the interest rates that central
banks control. It then considers the role that
forecasts play in the conduct of monetary pol-
icy by central banks whose single goal is to
maintain price stability, such as the Eurosystem
and the Bank of England. It shows that, if the
central banks mandate is defined in terms of
inflationstabilizationonly,itmaybeinthepub-
lics best interest that the central bank stabilize
forecasts for inflation at some horizon, instead
ofstabilizingcurrentinflation.Evidencefroma
small simulation model suggests that a horizon




single goal of price stability have done so in the context of
adopting an inflation target. The experiences of these coun-
tries, among them New Zealand, Canada, and Sweden as
well as the United Kingdom, with the strategy of inflation
targeting are examined in Bernanke and others. Kahn and
Parrish survey the operational implementation of inflation
targets in a number of countries. The case of the Bank of
England is studied in this article as an example of an infla-
tion-targetingcountry.However,theuseofforecastsinmon-
etary policy is not limited to inflation-targeting countries, as
illustratedbytherolethatforecastsplayfortheEurosystem.
2 A number of studies examine inflation forecast targeting
asastrategyformonetarypolicy,notablytheworkofSvens-
son.IncontrasttoSvensson,however,thepresentstudyaims
to explain why a central bank might focus on inflation fore-
casts at a horizon longer than the shortest horizon at which
the central bank is able to control inflation.
3 The model is developed in more detail in Amato and
Laubach, who also present further details about the simula-
tions.
4 While some employees wages are adjusted more fre-
quently, many employees are covered by wage contracts
that are adjusted annually.
5 In addition to the three components displayed in the top
panel, the welfare loss includes the contribution from aver-
age inflation incurred by interest rate variability and the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Because this
component is quantitatively small, it is not displayed in the
top panel.
6 The results of Batini and Haldane refer to the optimal
forecast horizon when the central bank uses an interest rate
ruleinwhichthecurrentinterestraterespondstodeviations
of the inflation forecast from the inflation target at some
horizon.
REFERENCES
Amato, Jeffery D., and Thomas Laubach. 1999. Forecast-
BasedMonetaryPolicy,FederalReserveBankofKansas
City, working paper no. 99-10, October.
Batini, Nicoletta, and Andrew G. Haldane. 1999. Forward-
Looking Rules for Monetary Policy, in John B. Taylor,
ed., Monetary Policy Rules. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Bernanke, Ben S., Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin,
and Adam S. Posen. 1999. Inflation Targeting: Lessons
from the International Experience. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Bowen, Alex. 1995. British Experience with Inflation
Targetry, in Leonardo Leiderman and Lars E.O. Svens-
son, eds., Inflation Targets. London: CEPR.
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 2000 11Budd, Alan. 1998. Economic Policy, with and without Fore-
casts, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, November.
European Central Bank. 1998. A Stability-Oriented
Monetary Policy Strategy for the ESCB, October 13,
available on the internet at http://www.ecb.int/press/
pr981013_1.htm.
EuropeanCentralBank.1999.TheStability-OrientedMon-
etary Policy Strategy of the Eurosystem, ECB Monthly
Bulletin, January.
Goodhart,CharlesA.E.1999.CentralBankersandUncer-
tainty, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, February.
Kahn, George A., and Klara S. Parrish. 1998. Conducting
Monetary Policy with Inflation Targets, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Third
Quarter.
Svensson, Lars E.O. 1997. Inflation Forecast Targeting:
Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets, Euro-
pean Economic Review, 41.
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY